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ARGUMENT 
I, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT PORTION OF 
THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT FROM WHICH APPEAL IS TAKEN. 
Although appellee argues that there is ample evidence to 
support the trial court's judgment, appellee fails to identify any 
evidence that supports that portion of the trial court's judgment 
from which appeal is taken. Instead, appellee elects to give two 
examples, discussed below, and to imply that other evidence would 
also support the trial court's judgment. Appellee's failure to 
identify evidence supporting the trial court's judgment is 
demonstrative of the lack thereof. 
Appellee's first example involves a finding of fact which is 
not disputed on appeal. The trial court found that the written 
fee agreement presented at trial was not signed by defendant 
Semnani. The trial court found that the plaintiff Mr. Roundy had 
commenced representation of Mr. Semnani with the belief that the 
written fee agreement governed the relationship between the 
parties, but that defendant Semnani believed that there was a 
verbal agreement. [Transcript from the Trial Court's decision 
rendered March 13, 1997 (hereinafter "T2"), pp. 4:2-23, Record, 
pp. 898.] 
Said finding was set forth on page 6 of appellant's brief in 
the statement of facts. Said finding is not disputed. Appellant 
is not requesting that the trial court should have found the 
existence of a written fee agreement. Instead, the appellant 
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disputes on appeal that there was any evidence that would support 
the trial court's finding that the parties subsequently entered 
into a verbal contingency fee agreement. 
Appellee's second example involves the correspondence which 
was presented in detail and in total in appellant's brief. In 
contrast, appellee makes only cursory references to the 
correspondence. The correspondence speaks for itself. The 
correspondence consists of argument among the parties as to the 
terms of the attorney-client fee arrangement between them. The 
correspondence establishes that the fee dispute was never 
resolved. 
Appellee also fails to address the absence of any verbal 
testimony at trial by defendant Semnani that the parties ever 
resolved the fee dispute! Neither of the parties testified that 
they entered into an oral fee arrangement at the time of the 
correspondence. Neither party testified that the correspondence 
in any way reflected reaching a resolution. Defendant wholly 
failed to elicit any testimony from either Mr. Roundy or defendant 
Semnani that the parties had agreed to anything at the time of the 
correspondence. On the other hand, Mr. Roundy testified in detail 
to the contrary. [Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter "Tl"), 
pp. 62:20-63:10, 64:4-65:5, 77:15-78:15, 80:24-87:11, 148:19-
149:6, 152:12-25, Record, pp. 766-769, 781-782, 784-791, 852-853, 
856.] See page 8 of appellant's brief in the statement of facts, 
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paragraph 8. Everything stated by Mr. Roundy in the 
correspondence is based on his intention and belief that the 
written contract should be enforced pursuant to its terms. 
As a matter of law, a contract cannot be imposed upon the 
plaintiff absent evidence that there was a meeting of the minds. 
As the evidence demonstrates, Mr. Roundy accepted a settlement 
with Miss Clark of $2,250.00 on December 8, 1995. [Tl, pp. 82:13-
83:2, Record, pp. 630, 786-787.] Four days later, on December 12, 
1995, Mr. Semnani authorized Mr. Roundy to accept that settlement 
and a second settlement if Mr. Roundy would in return accept a 
one-third contingency fee split. [Tl, p. 83:3-10, Record, p. 633, 
787.] Not only did Mr. Roundy refuse, he could not possibly have 
based his acceptance dated December 8, 1995 on an authorization 
not made until December 12, 1995! Yet, this is the only argument 
advanced by appellant in support of the trial court's judgment. 
As appellee points out, on December 12, 1997, defendant 
Semnani sent a facsimile to Mr. Roundy which states that he 
received Mr. Roundy's December 7, 1997 letter on December 11, 
1997. [Record, pp. 603, 633.] The letter authorizes Mr. Roundy to 
settle the matter with both Miss Clark and Mr. Barkey. The letter 
does not state that Mr. Roundy was authorized to settle with Miss 
Clark only. The letter to does state that Mr. Roundy was earlier 
authorized to settle with either defendant on any basis. The 
letter expressly states only that, as of the date of the letter, a 
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new authorization to settle is given. Yet, not only did Mr. 
Roundy not follow the direction set forth in the letter, Mr. 
Roundy had already settled with Miss Clark only. [Tl, pp. 82:13-
83:2, Record, pp. 63 0, 786-787.] Without some testimony from some 
witness, in cannot be concluded that the parties had earlier 
verbally discussed settlement or resolved the fee dispute between 
attorney and client. Appellee's suggestion is pure speculation 
and conjecture unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. The 
remaining correspondence between the parties overwhelmingly 
demonstrates the very serious dispute that was continuing between 
the parties as to their fee arrangement. [Record, pp. 603, 628-
646.] Mr. Roundy made efforts to resolve the matter with defendant 
Semnani. Mr. Roundy's letter of January 16, 1996 was one such 
effort. [Record, pp. 603, 644.] Mr. Roundy offered to give 
defendant Semnani 2/3 of the settlement with Mr. Barkey as a 
settlement. In the same letter, Mr. Roundy expressly did not 
offer any money from the settlement with Miss Clark. The same 
letter also sets forth the alternative enforcement of the terms of 
the written fee agreement if Mr. Roundy's settlement offer was not 
accepted by defendant Semnani. Defendant Semnani rejected Mr. 
Roundy's settlement offer. 
Even if defendant Semnani had made his authorization in 
advance of the actual settlement, his authorization would not have 
created a contract between the parties. It is hornbook law that 
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one party to a contract cannot unilaterally set the terms of the 
contract. Mr. Roundy flatly refused the notion of a one-third 
contingency fee arrangement. There is no evidence that he agreed 
to such a provision. If clients could cause the modification of 
their fee arrangements with lawyers in the fashion employed by 
defendant Semnani, every contingency fee client would be 
authorizing their attorney to settle only if he agreed to a lower 
fee. Attorney-client relationships would become dysfunctional if 
clients were permitted to engage in such manipulation. In 
particular, where the attorney is not agreeable, the client's 
effort violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
II, ALL APPLICABLE EVIDENCE WAS MARSHALLED BY APPELLANT. 
All applicable evidence was marshalled by appellant. 
Appellant included in his brief every piece of correspondence, 
including those expressly identified by the trial court in support 
of its judgment. [See Brief of the Appellant, pp. 9-13, Addendum, 
Exhibit UD."] Appellant also set forth in the statement of facts 
the trial court's finding that the parties had not entered into a 
binding fee agreement and the evidence in support thereof, even 
though that portion of the judgment was not disputed. [See Brief 
of the Appellant, pp. 4-6.] There was no need to provide further 
analysis in support of the undisputed portion of the judgment. 
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Certainly, appellant's brief contained all of the evidence which 
appellee states appellant should have marshalled. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE CASE BASED 
ON A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff had commenced 
representation of the defendant with the belief that the written 
fee agreement governed the relationship between the parties, but 
that the defendant believed that there was a verbal agreement. 
[T2, p. 4:12-23, Record, p. 898.] There was no evidence to 
support a finding that the parties subsequently entered into a 
verbal one-third contingency fee arrangement, in the heat of their 
dispute over the matter. Therefore, a contract must be implied in 
quantum meruit and damages must be determined on a quantum meruit 
basis. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER 
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT BY EXPRESS DECISION, 
THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT CANNOT BE UPHELD ON THAT BASIS. 
The trial court did not consider the theory of quantum 
meruit. The trial court expressly determined that it did not need 
to consider the theory of quantum meruit because it had made a 
finding of an oral contract. [T2, p. 6:19-24, Record, p. 900.] 
The trial court made no findings of fact concerning the value of 
plaintiff Mr. Roundy's legal services or the benefit to defendant 
Semnani. 
Appellee's suggestion that the trial court judgment might be 
upheld on the basis of quantum meruit is ludicrous. The judgment 
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that there was an oral agreement. If that decision is 
overturned, then damages must be determined on the basis of 
quantum meruit. Merely because the ultimate dollar figure might 
be the same does not justify upholding an erroneous judgment 
without considering the quantum meruit basis for damages. In 
fact, it is virtually impossible that the quantum meruit value of 
plaintiff Mr. Roundy's services would be even close to the amount 
of the present judgment. 
Appellee does not dispute that the Mr. Roundy established at 
trial all of the elements for quantum meruit, both for a contract 
implied in fact and implied in law. Instead, appellee only argues 
for a dollar amount. The proper dollar amount is a question, 
first, for the trial court. Nonetheless, appellee's contention 
that the benefit to defendant was only one-third of the amount 
recovered is logically inconsistent. Likewise, appellee's 
contention that the fair market value of plaintiff's services is 
one-third of the amount recovered is entirely inconsistent with 
the valuation of an attorney's services made in any other reported 
case. Appellee's argument presumes that an attorney guarantees 
some recovery for a client. Appellee's argument further presumes 
that there is no non-economic benefit to representation by an 
attorney. Mr. Roundy's hourly fee of $100 per hour is very common 
and a reasonable charge to have an attorney in Salt Lake City 
represent a person's economic and non-economic interests. 
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Defendant presented no evidence concerning the value of Mr. 
Roundy's services. Defendant Semnani, in fact, testified that he 
was advised in writing of Mr. Roundy's hourly rate. 
V. APPELLANT SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS RELATIVE TO TRIAL. 
If Mr. Roundy prevails on this appeal, then there can be no 
question that he is the prevailing party entitled to costs. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Roundy was also the prevailing party at the 
trial court level. Appellee's brief ignores the fact that earlier 
orders were issued against defendant Semnani and in favor of Mr. 
Roundy, but which Mr. Roundy obtained relief prayed for in the 
complaint prior to the time of trial. [See Order, Record pp. 204-
209.] Further, it was only at trial that defendant Semnani 
finally changed his plea from one of no payment whatsoever to Mr. 
Roundy to a plea for a one-third contingent fee. Interestingly, 
the trial court stated that it was not sure who was the prevailing 
party. [T2, p. 7:9-10, Record, p. 901.] 
VI, APPELLEE SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED FEES 
RELATIVE TO THIS APPEAL. 
The only piece of evidence referenced by the trial court in 
support of the finding that Mr. Roundy agreed to a one-third 
contingency fee is the letter of Mr. Roundy, dated December 12, 
1995. [T2, p. 5:20-24, Record, p. 899.] Yet, no reasonable person 
could possibly read said letter to support a finding that the 
parties had reached an agreement as to attorney fees. The letter 
provided: 
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I received your facsimile this evening. I am surprised 
by your statement concerning a "verbal agreement." When you 
were in my office last, you claimed there was a verbal 
agreement for 50 percent of any recovery. Now you are 
claiming 33 percent?! 
Under paragraph 3 of our written agreement, I am to 
receive as an attorney's fee the greater of one third of any 
recovery or $100.00 per hour, up to the total amount 
recovered. My attorney's fee is not to be reduced by the 
retainer provided for in paragraph 1 or by costs and expenses 
provided in paragraph 4. The basis for our contract was 
fully discussed prior to the commencement of representation. 
I have received offers totalling $4,000.00 on your 
behalf. I have stated that I am willing to give you 
something from the money which you owe me, because I know 
that you want some money from the case. I will accept 
$2,000.00 as my attorney's fee, despite the tremendous amount 
of time I have devoted to your case. That attorney's fee can 
be paid from the settlement proceeds from Ms. Clark. You may 
receive additional money in settlement from Mr. Barkey. 
Whatever money you receive can be yours. However, if you 
would like me to continue to assist you, you will need to 
agree to pay me $75.00 per hour, beginning December 22, 1995. 
My attorney's fees will not be contingency after December 22, 
1995. I will bill you each month, and all terms of act other 
than paragraph 3 will remain unchanged. If you accept these 
terms immediately, I may be able to settle the matter with 
Mr. Barkey prior to December 22, 1995, in which case, there 
would be no additional attorney's fee unless I also do 
additional work after December 22, 1995. Thus, it will be to 
your advantage to act as soon as possible so that we can make 
a counter-offer to Mr. Barkey. These terms are not open to 
negotiation. This offer will expire on December 22, 1995 and 
it will be automatically withdrawn if you reject it or 
attempt to negotiate further. 
[Record, pp. 603, 634-635.] 
Similarly, all of the other correspondence clearly 
establishes the existence of a conflict, and the absence of an 
agreement, between the parties during the time period relative to 
the trial court's judgment. After searching the record, appellant 
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has failed to find any testimony that the parties reached an 
agreement concerning attorneys fees during the time period 
relative to the trial court's judgment. Likewise, appellee has 
failed to identify a single line of supporting testimony. 
Both of the parties testified that they reached a certain 
agreement at the commencement of representation, and the Trial 
Court expressly found that both parties had different believes and 
that no agreement was reached at that time. [T2, pp. 4:2-23, 
Record, pp. 898.] Neither parties testified that they entered into 
an agreement of any type during the heat of the correspondence 
submitted into evidence as to the end of 1995. It is a complete 
mystery how the trial court came up with its finding that the 
parties reached an agreement at that time. 
Appellee's request for sanctions is without merit. Appellee 
has failed to establish that the appeal is frivolous. Appellee's 
brief also fails to properly set forth the relevant Rule. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff and Appellant Mr. 
Roundy respectfully requests that this Court reverse the holding 
of the Trial Court in the case at hand as to the finding of an 
oral contract, and direct the Trial Court to enter a judgment for 
attorney's fees earned based on Quantum Meruit as discussed 
herein, and further direct the Trial Court to award costs to Mr. 
Roundy as the prevailing party. 
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Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this :2s day of December, 1997. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Thor B. Roundy 
230 South 500 East, Suite 270 
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Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Bar No. 6435 
I, THOR B. ROUNDY, certify that on this / t> day of 
December, 1997, I served two copies of the attached REPLY BRIEF OF 
THE APPELLANT, Appellate Court No. 970568CA, upon counsel for the 
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